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1. Introduction 
 
Many studies have analyzed the efficiency of Cournot (quantity) and Bertrand (price) 
competition (e.g., Singh and Vives, 1984; Vives, 1985; Häckner, 2000; Amir and Jin, 
2001). These studies consider how the difference in the mode of competition affects the 
market outcomes and social welfare. There is a conventional view that price 
competition is more efficient than quantity competition in terms of greater consumer 
surplus and social welfare.  
   Using a differentiated duopoly model, Singh and Vives (1984) demonstrate that 
when products are substitutes, consumer and total surpluses are larger and profits 
smaller in Bertrand competition than in Cournot competition. Using a differentiated 
oligopoly model, Vives (1985) shows that price competition is more efficient than 
quantity competition. Furthermore, he finds that as the number of firms goes to infinity, 
the prices in the Bertrand equilibrium and the Cournot equilibrium go to marginal cost. 
Similarly, Häckner (2000) reconsiders the results in Singh and Vives (1984). In 
particular, he introduces product quality measure in a quadratic utility function. In this 
case, he demonstrates the following. If quality differences are large and products are 
complements, prices in the Bertrand equilibrium are higher than in the Cournot 
equilibrium; and if products are substitutes, high-quality firms may earn higher profits 
in the Bertrand equilibrium than in the Cournot equilibrium. However, he points out that 
it is not evident which mode of competition is more efficient in the n-firm specification. 
Hsu and Wang (2005) examine this issue and find that consumer and total surpluses are 
larger in the Bertrand equilibrium than in the Cournot equilibrium, regardless of the 
mode of competition. 
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   In a differentiated duopoly with linear demand and cost functions, Zanchettin (2006) 
allows for a wider range of demand and cost asymmetry between firms, i.e., product 
quality differences as in Häckner (2000) and shows that if asymmetry is strong and/or 
products are weakly differential, profits are higher in the Bertrand equilibrium than in 
the Cournot equilibrium. 
Recently, using a differentiated oligopoly model with symmetric product 
compatibility and network effects, Pal (2014) examines the efficiency of price and 
quantity competition. He demonstrates that if there are strong network externalities and 
imperfectly substitutable products, profit is higher in the Bertrand equilibrium than in 
the Cournot equilibrium.  
In this paper, we reconsider the important results of Singh and Vives (1984) by 
introducing product compatibility into the network effect models of Katz and Shapiro 
(1985) and Economides (1996). In particular, focusing on the strength of a network 
effect relative to product substitutability and the degree of product compatibility 
between firms, we demonstrate that if asymmetric product compatibility with a strong 
network effect between firms arises, given certain conditions, the Cournot equilibrium 
is more efficient than the Bertrand equilibrium in terms of greater consumer, producer, 
and social surpluses. In fact, firms compete on price-cutting of network products such as 
the Internet and mobile phone services. However, if asymmetric product compatibility 
between the firms arises, consumers may lose their benefits and social welfare may 
decrease.  
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2. The Model 
 
2.1 Quantity competition with network compatibility effects  
We consider quantity competition in a horizontally differentiated products market with 
network compatibility effects. Following the model of Economides (1996), the linear 
inverse demand function of product i is given by: 
),( eijii SfqqAp +−−= q ,,2,1, jiji ≠=                    (1) 
where A  is the intrinsic market size, iq  )( jq  is the quantity of firm i (j), and 
( )1,0∈q  represents the degree of product substitutability. The network externality 
function is given by ),( eiSf  where 
e
iS  represents the expected network size of firm i. 
Based on the concept of fulfilled rational expectations, we assume that ,i
e
i SS =  where 
iS  is the real network size of firm i. We assume a linear network effect function; 
,)( ii aSSf =  where ( )1,0∈a  is a network effect parameter with network size. 
Furthermore, using equation (3.15) in Shy (2001, p. 62), the real network size of firm i 
is given by: 
,jiii qqS α+= ,,2,1, jiji ≠=                              (2) 
where [ ],1,0∈iα ,2,1=i  denotes the degree of product i’s compatibility with product j. 
Equation (2) implies that firm i will provide a compatible product with which the rival 
firm’s product j can operate. If 1=iα ),0( ,2,1=i  a user of product i operates (does not 
operate) perfectly with product j. iq  ),( jiqα ,,2,1, jiji ≠=  in equation (2) represents 
the own (incoming) effect on network size. 
Based on equations (1) and (2), the inverse demand function of firm i can be 
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expressed by: 
,)()1( jiii qaqaAp αq −−−−= ,,2,1, jiji ≠=                (3) 
where we assume that the own-price effect exceeds the cross-price effect, i.e., 
,
j
i
i
i
dq
dp
dq
dp
>  .,2,1, jiji ≠=  In this case, it follows that ,01 >−>− iaa αq .2,1=i   
To simplify the analysis, we assume that production costs are zero. Thus, the profit 
of firm i is expressed by: ,iii qp=p .2,1=i  Using the first-order profit-maximizing 
condition, ,0)1( =−−=
∂
∂
ii
i
i qap
q
p
 and equation (3), we derive the reaction function 
for firm i as follows: 
,
)1(2)1(2 j
i
i qa
a
a
Aq
−
−
−
−
=
αq .,2,1, jiji ≠=                    (4) 
From equation (4), the strategic relationship between the firms depends on the 
degree of product substitutability and the network compatibility effects: 
,)(0)( i
j
i a
q
q
αq <>⇔><
∂
∂
.,2,1, jiji ≠=                     (5) 
Equation (5) implies that a strategic substitute (complement) relationship between 
the firms holds if the degree of product substitutability is larger (smaller) than that of 
network compatibility.  
Furthermore, using the first-order profit-maximizing condition, the profit function is 
represented by ( ) ,)1( 2ii qa−=p .2,1=i  Thus, we derive the external effect of an 
increase in the quantity of firm j on the profit of firm i as follows: 
,)(0)()1(2 i
j
i
i
j
i a
q
qqa
q
αq
p
<>⇔><
∂
∂
−=
∂
∂
.,2,1, jiji ≠=         (6) 
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   For the following analysis, without the loss of generality, we assume asymmetric 
product compatibility between firms as follows: 
 
Assumption 1: .01 21 ≥>≥ αα  
 
Given equation (4), we derive the following Cournot–Nash equilibrium: 
{ },)()1(2
D
aaAq iCi
αq −−−
= ,2,1=i                        (7) 
where 0))(()1(4 21
2 >−−−−≡ αqαq aaaD  and ,0)()1(2 >−−− iaa αq .2,1=i  
Both of these conditions are satisfied because the own-price effect exceeds the 
cross-price effect. Superscript C denotes the Cournot−Nash equilibrium. 
 
2.2 Price competition with network compatibility effects  
Taking equation (3) into account, we derive the direct demand function of firm i as 
follows: 
,
)()1()}()1{(
∆
−+−−−−−
= jiiii
papaAaa
q
αqαq
,,2,1, jiji ≠=   (13) 
where .0))(()1( 21
2 >−−−−≡∆ αqαq aaa  Based on the first-order 
profit-maximization condition, i.e., ,0
1
=
∆
−
−=
∂
∂
ii
i
i paq
p
p
 and equation (13), the 
reaction function for firm i is: 
,
)1(2)1(2
)}()1{(
j
ii
i pa
a
a
Aaap
−
−
+
−
−−−
=
αqαq  .,2,1, jiji ≠=      (14) 
Thus, the strategic relationship between the firms depends on the degree of product 
substitutability and network compatibility: 
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,)(0)( i
j
i a
p
p
αq <>⇔<>
∂
∂
.,2,1, jiji ≠=                    (15) 
Equation (15) implies that a strategic complement (substitute) relationship between the 
firms holds if the degree of product substitutability is higher (lower) than that of 
network compatibility.  
Furthermore, using the first-order profit-maximization condition, the profit function 
is ( ) ,1 2ii p
a
∆
−
=p .2,1=i  Thus, we derive the external effect of an increase in firm j on 
the profit of firm i as follows: 
,)(0)()1(2 i
j
i
i
j
i a
p
ppa
p
αq
p
<>⇔<>
∂
∂
∆
−
=
∂
∂
.,2,1, jiji ≠=       (16) 
Given equation (14), we derive the following Bertrand–Nash equilibrium: 
{ },))(())(1()1(2 21
2
D
aaaaaAp iBi
αqαqαq −−−−−−−
= ,2,1=i    (17) 
where 0))(())(1()1(2 21
2 >−−−−−−− αqαqαq aaaaa i .2,1=i  This condition is 
satisfied because the own-price effect exceeds the cross-price effect. Superscript B 
denotes the Bertrand−Nash equilibrium. 
 
 
3. Comparison: Cournot equilibrium vs. Bertrand equilibrium in the presence of 
asymmetric network compatibility effects 
 
3.1 Prices, quantities, and profits 
Using the first-order profit-maximizing conditions in the case of quantity and price 
competition, price and profit in the Cournot equilibrium are expressed as 
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C
i
C
i qap )1( −=  and  ( ) ,)1( 2CiCi qa−=p .2,1=i  Similarly, for the quantity and profit 
in the Bertrand equilibrium, we have Bi
B
i p
aq
∆
−
=
1  and ( ) ,1 2BiBi pa∆
−
=p .2,1=i   
For the following analysis, with respect to the parameters of network effect and 
product substitutability, we make the following assumption. 
 
Assumption 2: .q>a  
 
   Assumption 2 implies that the network effect is larger than the substitutability effect 
between the products. Taking equations (7) and (17) into account, given Assumption 1, 
we directly obtain the following results. 
 
Lemma 1 
(i) ,)( Bi
C
i qq >< ,0)())(()( 21 <>−−⇔<> αqαq aapp
B
i
C
i ,2,1=i  
(ii) ,)()( j
B
i
C
i aαqpp <>⇔<> .,2,1, jiji ≠=  
 
First, as in Lemma 1 (i), if the degree of network compatibility effects of both 
products is either lower or higher than that of product substitutability, it follows that 
.0))(( 21 >−− αqαq aa  In this case, we have the same results as those of Singh and 
Vives (1984).1 That is, the quantity (price) is lower (higher) in the Cournot equilibrium 
than in the Bertrand equilibrium.  
1 If either Assumption 1 does not hold (i.e., a>q ), symmetric product compatibility 
(i.e., 10 21 ≤==≤ ααα ) or no network effects (i.e., 0=a ), we have the same results 
as those of Singh and Vives (1984). 
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However, if there are asymmetric network compatibility effects between the firms, 
i.e., ,21 αqα aa >>  it follows that .0))(( 21 <−− αqαq aa  In this case, we derive the 
opposite results: quantity (price) is higher (lower) in the Cournot equilibrium than in the 
Bertrand equilibrium.  
Second, as in Lemma 1 (ii), the amount of profits in the Cournot equilibrium and in 
the Bertrand equilibrium depend on the degree of the network compatibility effects of 
the rival firm’s product. If the degree of network compatibility effects of both products 
is lower than that of product substitutability, we have the same results as those of Singh 
and Vives (1984).2 That is, the profit is higher in the Cournot equilibrium than that in 
the Bertrand equilibrium. However, if the degree of network compatibility effects of 
both firms is higher than that of product substitutability, profit is higher in the Bertrand 
equilibrium than that in the Cournot equilibrium. This result is the same as that in Pal 
(2014, Proposition 1). 
Furthermore, if there are asymmetric network compatibility effects between the 
firms, i.e., ,21 αqα aa >>  we derive the following results: the profit of firm 1 (2) 
producing the product with larger (smaller) network compatibility effects than a certain 
level of product substitutability is lower (higher) in the Cournot equilibrium than in the 
Bertrand equilibrium. In this case, following Singh and Vives (1984), because firm 2’s 
product is a substitute good as a result of the smaller network compatibility effects, the 
profit of firm 1 is higher in the Cournot equilibrium than in the Bertrand equilibrium. 
Conversely, because the nature of firm 1’s product is a complement good as a result of 
the larger network compatibility effects, the profit of firm 2 is higher in the Bertrand 
2 Under the same conditions presented in footnote 1, the profit is higher (lower) in the 
Cournot equilibrium than that in the Bertrand equilibrium, if products are substitutes 
(complements). 
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equilibrium than in the Cournot equilibrium. 
 
3.2 Consumer surplus, producer surplus, and social surplus 
First, taking equation (1) into account, consumer surplus is given by: 
                ,
2
)(2)( 2221
2
1
kkkk
k qqqqCS ++= q ., BCk =                  (18) 
From equation (18), we can express consumer surplus as ( ),, 21 kkk qqCSCS =  ., BCk =  
Based on Lemma 1 (i), we derive the following relationship: 
       .0)(0)())(()( 2121 ><




 −




 −⇔><−−⇔<> α
q
α
q
αqαq
aa
aaCSCS BC   (19) 
In view of equation (19), we summarize the results as follows. 
 
Lemma 2 
(i) If it holds that either 
a
q
αα >> 21  or ,21 αα
q
>>
a
 it follows that .CB CSCS >  
(ii) If it holds that ,21 α
q
α >>
a
 it follows that .SC CSCS >  
 
As in Lemma 2 (i), if the degree of network compatibility effects of both products is 
either lower or higher than that of product substitutability, it follows that 
.0))(( 21 >−− αqαq aa  In this case, as in Singh and Vives (1984), consumer surplus is 
larger in the Bertrand equilibrium than in the Cournot equilibrium. Conversely, as 
shown in Lemma 2 (ii), if there are asymmetric network compatibility effects between 
the firms, i.e., ,21 α
q
α >>
a
 it follows that .0))(( 21 <−− αqαq aa  In this case, 
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consumer surplus is higher in the Cournot equilibrium than in the Bertrand equilibrium.  
   Second, we can express producer surplus as ,21
kkkPS pp += ., BCk =  Thus, 
taking Assumptions 1 and 2, and Lemma 1 (ii) into account, we obtain the following 
results directly. 
,1 2121 αα
qααq >>>⇔>>⇔>
a
aaPSPS BC            (20) 
,1 2121 a
aaPSPS BC qααqαα >>≥⇔>>⇔<             (21) 
The results shown in equations (20) and (21) are the same as in Singh and Vives 
(1984).  
However, in the case of asymmetric network compatibility effects, i.e., 
,01 2121 ≥>>≥⇔>> α
q
ααqα
a
aa  the comparison of producer surplus is not 
determined uniquely. That is, we can derive the following relationship: 
.0)()()()( 21 ><−+−⇔<> αqαq aaPSPS
BC            (22) 
Equation (22) implies that if the degree of network compatibility effects of firm 1’s 
product is sufficiently large, producer surplus is larger in the Cournot equilibrium than 
in the Bertrand equilibrium. For example, whenever product 1 (2) is perfectly 
compatible (incompatible), i.e., 11 =α  and 02 =α  in the one-sided compatibility case, 
this result arises. Otherwise, producer surplus is smaller in the Cournot equilibrium than 
in the Bertrand equilibrium.  
Equation (22) can be rewritten as follows: 
.)(2)( 21 αα
q
+><⇔<>
a
PSPS BC                        (23) 
Given Assumption 2, we have the following two cases according to the size of the 
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parameters of network effects and product substitutability.  
Case (1): 
aa
qq
>>12   
   (i) If the parameters of product compatibility of both firms, i.e., ),,( 21 αα  fall into 
the following set,  
,12,01),(),( 212121211






−<+≥>>≥≡Γ
aa
q
ααα
q
ααααα  
then it follows that .BC PSPS <  
  (ii) If the parameters of product compatibility of both firms, i.e., ),,( 21 αα  fall into 
the following set,  
,12,01),(),( 212121212






−>+≥>>≥≡Γ
aa
q
ααα
q
ααααα  
then it follows that .BC PSPS >  
Case (2): 
aa
qq
>>
21   
   (i) If the parameters of product compatibility of the firms, i.e., ),,( 21 αα  fall into 
the following set,  
,2,02),(),( 212121211






<+≥>>≥≡Ψ
aaa
q
ααα
q
α
q
αααα  
then it follows that .BC PSPS <  
   (ii) If the parameters of product compatibility of the firms, i.e., ),,( 21 αα  fall into 
the following set,  
,2,02),(),( 212121212






>+≥>>≥≡Ψ
aaa
q
ααα
q
α
q
αααα  
then it follows that .BC PSPS >  
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   Based on the comparative analysis of producer surplus, i.e., equations (20), (21), 
and (23), taking Assumption 1 into account, we summarize the results as follows. 
 
Lemma 3  
(1)  Regarding the parameters of network effects and product substitutability, it holds 
that .12
aa
qq
>>  In this case, we have the following. 
(i) If the parameters of product compatibility of the firms, i.e., ),,( 21 αα  fall into 
either of the following sets, it follows that .CB PSPS >  






>>≥≡Ω
a
q
αααααα 2121211 1),(),(  or 
,12,01),(),( 212121211






−<+≥>>≥≡Γ
aa
q
ααα
q
ααααα  
   (ii) If the parameters of product compatibility of the firms, i.e., ),,( 21 αα  fall into 
either of the following sets, it follows that .BC PSPS >  






≥>>≡Ω 0),(),( 2121212 αα
q
αααα
a
 or 
,12,01),(),( 212121212






−>+≥>>≥≡Γ
aa
q
ααα
q
ααααα  
(2) Regarding the parameters of network effects and product substitutability, it holds 
that .21
aa
qq
>>  In this case, we have the following. 
(i) If the parameters of product compatibility of the firms, i.e., ),,( 21 αα  fall into 
either of the following sets, it follows that .CB PSPS >  
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





>>≥≡Ω
a
q
αααααα 2121211 1),(),(  or 
.2,02),(),( 212121211






<+≥>>≥≡Ψ
aaa
q
ααα
q
α
q
αααα  
(ii) If the parameters of product compatibility of the firms, i.e., ),,( 21 αα  fall into 
either of the following sets, it follows that .BC PSPS >  






≥>>≡Ω 0),(),( 2121212 αα
q
αααα
a
 or 
.2,02),(),( 212121212






>+≥>>≥≡Ψ
aaa
q
ααα
q
α
q
αααα  
 
   Therefore, based on Lemmas 2 and 3, we present the main results of this paper as 
follows. 
 
Proposition 1 
(1) When it holds that ,1 21 a
q
αα >>≥  consumer, producer, and social surplus are 
larger in the Bertrand equilibrium than in the Cournot equilibrium. 
(2) When it holds that ,021 ≥>> αα
q
a
 consumer (producer) surplus is larger in the 
Bertrand (Cournot) equilibrium than in the Cournot (Bertrand) equilibrium. However, 
the efficiency of the Bertrand equilibrium and the Cournot equilibrium in terms of 
social surplus is not determined uniquely. 
 
Under the situation in Proposition 1 (1), i.e., because both firms’ network 
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compatibility effects are smaller than their product substitutability effects, producer 
surplus is larger in the Bertrand equilibrium than in the Cournot equilibrium. Thus, 
social surplus is larger in the Bertrand equilibrium than in the Cournot equilibrium. On 
the contrary, Proposition 1 (2) shows the situation in which both firms’ network 
compatibility effects are smaller than their product substitutability effects. In other 
words, network effects are negligible under this situation, which corresponds to the case 
assumed in Singh and Vives (1984). Thus, intuitively, social surplus is larger in the 
Bertrand equilibrium than in the Cournot equilibrium, although producer surplus is 
larger in the Cournot equilibrium than in the Bertrand equilibrium.  
   The results presented in Proposition 1 are virtually identical to those in Singh and 
Vives (1984). That is, even though network compatibility effects work, if the effects 
between the firms are symmetric or not sufficiently different, the conventional wisdom 
presented by Singh and Vives holds. However, if network compatibility effects between 
the firms are significantly asymmetric, the opposite result is true. 
 
Proposition 2 
When it holds that ,01 21 ≥>>≥ α
q
α
a
 the following outcomes arise: 
(i) If either 01221 >−>+ a
q
αα  or 
a
q
αα
2121 >>+  holds, then consumer, producer, 
and social surplus are larger in the Cournot equilibrium than in the Bertrand 
equilibrium. 
(ii) If either 1221 −<+ a
q
αα  or 1221 <<+ a
q
αα  holds, then consumer (producer) 
surplus is larger in the Cournot (Bertrand) equilibrium than in the Bertrand (Cournot) 
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equilibrium. However, the efficiency of the Bertrand equilibrium and the Cournot 
equilibrium in terms of social surplus is not determined uniquely. 
 
As shown in Lemma 1 (i), if there are asymmetric network compatibility effects 
between the firms, in other words, if the degree of product compatibility is sufficiently 
asymmetric between the firms, quantity is larger in the Cournot equilibrium than in the 
Bertrand equilibrium. Thus, consumer surplus is larger in the Cournot equilibrium than 
in the Bertrand equilibrium. Furthermore, as in Proposition 2 (i), if the total value of 
product compatibility of the firms is larger than a certain value, producer surplus is 
larger in the Cournot equilibrium than in the Bertrand equilibrium. Thus, social surplus 
is larger in the Cournot equilibrium than in the Bertrand equilibrium. 
On the contrary, as in Proposition 2 (ii), if the total value of product compatibility of 
the firms is smaller than a certain value, producer surplus is smaller in the Cournot 
equilibrium than in the Bertrand equilibrium. Thus, the efficiency of the Bertrand 
equilibrium and the Cournot equilibrium in terms of social surplus is not determined 
uniquely. The results in this situation are different from those in Proposition 1 (2). 
Literally, the results are ambiguous. 
 
 
4. Concluding Remarks 
 
Based on a horizontally differentiated duopoly model, i.e., Singh and Vives (1984), 
including network effects and product compatibility, we have demonstrated that the 
Cournot equilibrium is more efficient than the Bertrand equilibrium in terms of 
 16 
consumer surplus and social surplus, given certain conditions such as sufficient 
asymmetric network compatibility effects between the firms. 
We understand the limitation of our model based on specific assumptions such as 
the linearity of various functions, duopoly, and Assumption 1, i.e., network effects are 
larger than product substitutability effects. Thus, unless Assumption 1 holds, we obtain 
the same results as in Singh and Vives (1984). In other words, the assumption of strong 
network effects and asymmetric product compatibility follows our main results, 
Proposition 2 (i).  
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